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Establishing Legal Norms Through
Multilateral Negotiation
The Laws of War
by.George H. Aldrich*

T

HERE ARE BASICALLY TWO WAYS to codify international law: Through the practice of nations and the consequent development of customary law, or through multilateral
negotiation. For the laws of war, we have chosen the latter
and have been engaged in the Geneva Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law

since 1974.1 For everyone involved, there is a growing conviction
that the multilateral law-making conference is the least efficient
and most difficult machinery ever developed by the art of diplomacy.
A quick glance at the U. N. Law of the Sea Conference will
show that the Geneva Conference on the Laws of War is not
unique in its glacial progress or in its inefficiency. Can it possibly
be worthwhile to put a hundred or more governments through
such a laborious exercise? More importantly, will the end product
justify the time and effort put into its production? These are the
questions I would like to examine in the context of the continuing
Conference on the Laws of War.
It should be noted that this Conference has certain advantages
not shared by all such conferences. First, it began with a negotiating text prepared by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (I.C.R.C.) based on both its own experience and expertise,
and on the comments and criticisms obtained from two confer* Member of the Indiana Bar; LL.M., 1958, LL.B., 1957, Harvard Law School;
B.A., 1954, De Pauw; currently Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State.
I This Conference was convened by the Swiss Government as depository of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Protection of War Victims. Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956]
6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
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ences of government experts in 1971 and 1972.2 It took the Law
of the Sea Conference two sessions to develop a single negotiating text; whereas, the Laws of War Conference began in 1974 with
a well thought-out single text. Secondly, the participation in the
Laws of War Conference is somewhat limited. Although approximately 120 delegations are technically accredited, 3 in fact
the active participants number no more than 70; in some of the
committees, one is lucky to find more than 40 represented on a
consistent basis. Despite these relative advantages, however, the
Conference has consumed three annual 2-month sessions, and will
return next spring for a fourth, and presumably final, session with
a number of difficult issues still unresolved. 4 If this experience
is a useful guide, the Law of the Sea Conference may hope to
finish sometime comfortably into the 1980's.
A fundamental decision, with significant implications for
speed and efficiency, which must be faced in each multilateral
conference, is whether to make decisions by majority vote, by
consensus, or by something in between. At the Geneva Conference on the Laws of War we have moved to something in between, but something that approaches consensus.
At the first conference session in 1974, this was not the case.
Much time was lost that year on political issues, such as invitations
to national liberation movements and to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, all of these issues being
decided by majority vote. 5 This procedure carried over to one
substantive matter - the scope of the protocol on international
armed conflicts, where it was also decided by majority vote that
wars of national liberation were international armed conflicts to
2 These two draft additional protocols were published in Geneva in June
1973 by the International Committee of the Red Cross and have, throughout the
Conference, served as the basis for negotiation.
3 All parties to the Geneva Conventions and all members of the United
Nations were invited. One hundred and twenty-five governments were represented at the first session, but by the third session this number was reduced to
106.
4 The Conference has met from February 20 to March 29, 1974, from February 3 to April 18, 1975, and from April 21 to June 11, 1975. The fourth
session is scheduled for March 17 to June 10, 1977.
5 See Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics?, 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1
(1975); Forsythe, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law: Some Observations, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1975); Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The First Session
of the Diplomatic Conference, 5 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1974); and Cassese, Current Trends in the Development of the Law of Armed Conflict, 24 RIvISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBLICO (1974).
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which the new protocol and the 1949 Geneva Conventions would
apply. The United States and most of its Western friends and
allies were in the minority on this question, and it remains a serious
threat to our accession to the protocol.
At the second session of the Conference in 1975, many votes
were taken but with a difference. Most of the fundamental and
significant disagreements were first worked out through negotiated compromises. In particular, careful and successful efforts
were made by the United States and the Soviet Union to ensure
that any provisions adopted were acceptable to both of them and
their allies. For example, we compromised with the Soviet delegation, and thereby settled for less than we wanted in the way of
improving the protecting power system. Stung in Vietnam by
the refusal of our enemies to agree to the appointment of a protecting power to oversee the treatment of our prisoners, we wanted
the Conference to adopt an article that would establish a procedure
to ensure the appointment of a protecting power or a substitute
organization. We proposed the I.C.R.C. as the automatic fallback
in the event agreement could not be reached within a fixed period
of time. This was clearly unacceptable to the Soviets. We were
faced with a choice of whether to press for our preferred provision, which probably could have won a simple majority vote (although perhaps not the two-thirds vote required for final, plenary
adoption), or to strive for the best obtainable compromise. We
chose the latter. The result is an article that states clearly the
obligation to agree to a protecting power and establishes a procedure designed to make it very embarrassing to refuse one, but
that stops short of providing for a required, ultimate fallback.6
Such efforts at compromise with the Soviet Union had other,
more positive effects. For example, the North Vietnamese were
strongly opposed to codifying the customary law rule of proportionality, saying that it had been used to justify the American
air attacks against them. Proportionality is the rule of customary
law that says that an otherwise lawful attack becomes unlawful
if it may be expected to result in injury or damage disproportionate
to the military advantage sought. However, we worked out with
the Soviets a compromise in which we changed a few phrases,
including the key phrase "disproportionate" to "not excessive
in relation to," and they induced the Vietnamese to accept it. 7
6 See Forsythe, Who Guards the Guardians: Third Parties and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 70 AM. J. INTL L. 41 (1976).
7 The relevant text (Article 50) as adopted by Committee III reads as follows:
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This effort at compromise on key issues, coupled with voting
on lesser issues, continued at the third session of the Conference,
though with less success because the Soviets seemed less willing
to make an effort to convince their allies. This was particularly
noticeable in our efforts to produce a compromise on the vexing
question of prisoner-of-war status for guerrillas, where the Soviet
delegation repeatedly refused to press the North Vietnamese to
accept a compromise and told this author to negotiate the question
directly with the Vietnamese. Hopefully, the Soviets will be more
willing to be of assistance at the fourth session, since the result
on the guerrilla question was highly embarrassing to them - a
last-minute compromise which this author worked out with the
Vietnamese and which the Soviet delegation was unable to accept.8
There are, of course, arguments both for and against a consensus approach. However, with respect to the laws of war,
there is an unusually strong need for universality of acceptance
- one's enemies in warfare are, perhaps, unlikely to be found
among like-minded States, and a rule that is not universally accepted, or nearly so, is easier to ignore when it becomes inconvenient, as most rules eventually do. Also, when a rule is
unacceptable to one State or to a group of States, reservations will
be made to it if they are permissible. 9 We have experienced
recently in Vietnam the frustration of the law through the misuse

2. With respect to attacks, the Following precautions shall be taken:
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination ther&-

of, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated;
5. No provision of this article may be construed as authorization for
any attacks against the civilian population, civilians, or civilian objects.
sThe essence of the compromise was to accord prisoner-of-war and legitimate combatant status to most guerrillas who are members of the armed forces
of a party to a conflict but to deny it to those who fail during the preparations
for an attack to meet certain minimum requirements of distinction from the
civilian population. Even these latter guerrillas, however, would be entitled to
protections equivalent to those accorded prisoners of war.
9The Conference has not yet decided whether reservations will be prohibited
with respect to certain specified articles, as the I.C.R.C. has proposed, but it
seems likely that the decision will be against such a prohibition because the list
of articles would be virtually impossible to negotiate.
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of reservations, 10 and we should endeavor to avoid them in the
future.
Although in any multilateral negotiation each participating
State arrives with its own positions, which are based upon its
understanding of its own national interests, there are bound to be
a number of shared precepts, assumptions, and goals. A significant part of the challenge facing the negotiator is to understand
and utilize these shared precepts in order to foster broad agreement. In the negotiations on the laws of war, there are at least
three major precepts that are widely shared.
One may call
them the precepts of humanity, military necessity, and sovereignty.
The humanitarian precept has understandably guided the
International Committee of the Red Cross in its preparatory work
and is the most prominent theme underlying the two draft protocols
prepared by the I.C.R.C. as the basis for negotiation at the Conference. This precept is shared, in varying degrees, by all participants in the Conference. For most, it shows itself in a felt
need to improve the protections to be accorded civilians, but it
also influences, to some degree, the development of all the other
provisions of the protocols. It has even affected the heretofore
unsuccessful efforts to improve the protections available to the
captured guerrilla fighter.
The second shared precept is that of military necessity. This
precept means very different things to different people, but there
is a general acceptance that it limits the effects of the humanitarian precept in that the rules cannot be accepted and applied
if they would reduce military effectiveness too much. In other
words, some reduced effectiveness is an acceptable price to pay
for more humanitarianism, but there is a limit. Simply to state
this precept is to reveal its subjective character. It means something very different to the representative of a country that sees
itself fighting an offensive war and the representative of a country planning solely defensive activity and underground resistance.
Differences are obvious between countries that expect to rely
primarily on manpower and those that look to firepower. Thus,
although military necessity is undeniably a shared precept of

10The North Vietnamese construed improperly their reservation to Article
85 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of War as permitting them to deny prisoner-of-war status and protection to all captured Amer-

ican soldiers on the grounds that they all were war criminals.
sion of this subject in 10 M.
(1968).

See the discus-

WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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considerable importance, it is not very helpful in the development
of broadly acceptable rules of warfare restricting the use of force.
The concept of national sovereignty implies the sovereign
equality of States and the inequality of anything other than a State.
It has been wondrous to watch this concept prevail over the
humanitarian precept in the negotiation of the second protocol that dealing with non-international armed conflicts.
In this
Conference of sovereign States, the rebellious group is the least
favored of all, unless, of course, it is a national liberation movement, in which case it is the most favored. But that term is
defined narrowly in order to limit its application in effect to
Southern Africa and Palestine."
Sovereignty has also limited
progress in the improvement of the protecting power system and
other law enforcement mechanisms for international armed conflicts. Next year, the United States will try to gain acceptance
of an impartial inquiry commission to investigate alleged violations
of the protocol on international armed conflict, but past experience
does not give us reason to be confident of success, for the sovereign rights of States will most certainly be affronted by such a
commission. Yet, if there is any single need that is greatest in
the laws of war, it is the need to improve compliance with the law;
but this need is sacrificed to the precept of sovereignty.
Looking backward over the last 5 years of effort to develop
the laws of war through negotiation, and looking ahead at the
uncertain prospects for the 1977 session of the Conference, is it
possible to reach any conclusions about the choice between
codification and custom as means for the development of the law?
Certainly codification has proved to be slow and frustrating work.
It may yet produce a generally acceptable protocol on international
armed conflicts that will be a force for humanity and moderation
in the conduct of hostilities. If so, those of us who have endured
the frustrations will feel well rewarded. On the other hand,
we may discover that the final product meets the minimum requirements of only a very few countries; perhaps because of a
11 The Conference, at its first session in 1974, decided to invite as observers

"the

National

Liberation

Movements which are recognized by the regional

intergovernmental organization concerned."
It was understood that only the
Arab League and the Organization of African Unity recognized liberation movements. Similarly, in its amendment to Article 1 of Protocol I, as adopted by
the First Committee of the Conference, international armed conflicts are defined as including "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial and alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination. .. "
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perceived imbalance among the precepts, or perhaps because of
reaction against extraneous political blemishes, such as Article 1
on wars of national liberation. Despite the clear need for
humanitarian law in civil wars, the future of the protocol on noninternational armed conflicts would appear bleak in view of the
dominance of the precept of sovereignty among the great mass
of developing nations.
Yet, this author believes that the decision to make this effort
was justified, whatever the result. If we compare the law of
combat (the "Hague law"),12 which has been left to custom since
1907, with the law of the Geneva Conventions, which has gone
through several codifications, there is no doubt that the latter has
developed. more rapidly in this century. 13 Doubtless there are
various reasons why this has happened, but I believe the choice
of technique of legal development has been a significant factor.
For one thing, a codification conference forces national decisions
on limits on the use of force that would otherwise be deferred.
A government does not make such difficult decisions unless it is
forced to do so. There is, of course, a risk that decisions will be
made prematurely before the issue is ripe for decision. But the
risk of delay may be greater. If the law of aerial warfare had been
codified in a generally acceptable way in the 1920s and '30s,
would it have endured under the stress of the Second World War?
Would it have deterred the strategic bombing of cities? No
one can know, but the example underlines both the risks and the
benefits of the codification of combat law. One thing is clear:
Leaving the development of that law to custom is to leave the decisions to be made in the heat of battle by those who are fighting
wars and that tends to produce the lowest common :denominator.
12 See Hague Convention (111)
Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct.
18, 1907, [1910] 36 STAT. 2259, T.S. No. 538; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Annex Thereto, Oct. 18, 1907,
[1910] 36 STAT. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Hague Convention (V) Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, [19101 36 STAT. 2310, T.S. No. 540; and Hague Convention (IX)
Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907,
[1910] 36 STAT. 2351, T.S. No. 542.
13 Note that the United States Army Field Manual on the Law of Land
Warfare, DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10 (July 1956), states that "the customary
law of war is binding upon all nations" (para. 7) and that Hague Convention
No. IV has "been held to be declaratory of the customary law of war" (para. 6).
To the extent that this Convention remains declaratory of customary law, it is
obvious that the law has not developed significantly since 1907. There have, of
course, been some developments in customary law as revealed, for example, in
the trials of war criminals during and after the Second World War and in the
writings of scholars.
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The outcome of the present Geneva negotiations on the laws
of war is uncertain, The delegation of the United States remains
reasonably optimistic that the results will be positive. Perhaps
more importantly, we remain committed to doing all in our power
to produce, in Geneva, a general agreement on terms acceptable
to our Government, to our allies, to our potential adversaries,
and to as many other governments as possible. A more narrowly
acceptable agreement would have little value to us. 14 We believe
the challenge is worthy of our best efforts.
14 Secretary of State Kissinger expressed our commitment in a speech to the
American Ba*r Association in Montreal on August 11, 1975. He said: "The
United States is committed to the principle that fundamental human rights require legal protection under all circumstances; that some kinds of individual
suffering are intolerable no matter what threat nations may face. The American
people and Government deeply believe in fundamental standards of humane
conduct; we are committed to uphold and promote them; we will fight to vindicate them in international forums."

